Four justices appeared absolutely determined, on Wednesday, to overrule one of the most consequential Supreme Court decisions in the Court’s entire history.
Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council (1984) is arguably as important to the development of federal administrative law — an often technical area of the law, but one that touches on literally every single aspect of American life — as Brown v. Board of Education (1954) was important to the development of the law of racial equality. Chevron is a foundational decision, which places strict limits on unelected federal judges’ ability to make policy decisions for the entire nation.
As Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson said during Wednesday’s arguments, Chevron forces judges to grapple with a very basic question: “When does the court decide that this is not my call?”
And yet, four members of the Supreme Court — Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh — spent much of Wednesday’s arguments in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and Relentless v. Department of Commerce speaking of Chevron with the same contempt most judges reserve for cases like Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), the pro-segregation decision rejected by Brown.
The open question is whether the Court’s four most strident opponents of this foundational ruling can find a fifth vote.
None of the Court’s three Democratic appointees were open to the massive transfer of power to federal judges contemplated by the plaintiffs in these two cases. That leaves Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Amy Coney Barrett as the two votes that remain uncertain. To prevail — and to keep Chevron alive — the Justice Department needed its arguments to persuade both Roberts and Barrett to stay their hands.
No. What you are describing is how deference should work, not how it actually works. If it worked the way you say it does, I would have no problem with it. We are essentially in agreement on what should be happening.
Chevron deference is a two-step test. The first step is whether the statute explicitly authorizes the agency’s actions. If not, the second step asks whether the agency’s policy could conceivably arise from the statute.
The “reasonable” and “not arbitrary” questions you’re talking about only arise after those two steps have been taken. Chevron Deference says that the agency - not the court - is solely responsible for answering those questions.
With net neutrality, the courts ask whether Congress explicitly intended to suspend Net Neutrality, and concludes they did not explicitly require it. They next ask whether suspending net neutrality is a power conveyed to the FCC by statute. Indeed, the FCC should and does have that power. The plaintiff then wishes the court to ask whether the suspension of net neutrality is fair, reasonably, appropriate, not arbitrary, necessary and proper, etc. But, the court points to Chevron Deference and tells the plaintiff that only the agency can answer such questions.
Whether we agree that this is a fair and accurate summary of Chevron Deference, we can agree that the system I just described is not appropriate, while the system you described is appropriate. The fundamental difference between the two systems is whether the courts should or should not be empowered to judge the “reasonableness” of the agency’s interpretation.
The agencies are packed with right wing directors and executives every time we have a GOP president.
While the courts are packed with right-wing judges, plaintiffs in major cases largely avoid them by “shopping” for the judges they want: they can raise their questions in courts known to be friendly to their positions.
You are not correct.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/chevron_deference
Yes. The the right wing courts will uphold their interpretations and block liberal interpretations, so what will be left is only the conservative interpretation regardless of the president.